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Girma Parris is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Case Western Reserve University. His research focuses on how
political development in race and immigration interact with subnational institutional configurations to impact
and constrain subnational immigrant political incorporation.
1. CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION: IMMIGRATION, RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM
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INCORPORATION 14 (2018); Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions
in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 550 (1993).
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The United States of America: a nation of immigrants. Or so says American lore.
Yet historically with every immigration influx, there have been immigrant populist
backlashes which have enjoyed from tepid to strong support among pluralities of the
population. Chris Zepeda-Millán¶VLatino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization,
and Activism DQG $ELJDLO )LVKHU :LOOLDPVRQ¶V Welcoming New Americans: Local
Governments and Immigrant Incorporation capture how the politics of immigrant
LQFRUSRUDWLRQ EULQJ LQWR UHOLHI ZKDW 5RJHUV 6PLWK UHIHUV WR DV $PHULFD¶V ³PXOWLSOH
WUDGLWLRQV´ DQG WKHLU LQIOXHQFH RQ LPPLJUDQW LQFRUSRUDWLRQ LQ WKH WZHQW\-first century.1
Zepeda-Millán examines the causes and legacies of the 2006 Latinx mass protests.
Williamson investigates how small to medium sized cities have responded to increasing
immigrant populations as new immigrant destinations. Both studies investigate the
interrelationship between immigration influxes, immigrant incorporation, anti-immigrant
backlashes, and the role of race in facilitating the politics of all of the above. Ultimately,
both studies take stock of the politics of immigrant incorporation in the new millennium:
what shapes it; what are its electoral impacts; and what their findings suggest for
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LPPLJUDQWLQFRUSRUDWLRQJRLQJIRUZDUG,QGRLQJVRWKH\RIIHUDVQDSVKRWRI$PHULFD¶V
multiple traditions in the twenty-first century, a generation and a half removed from the
ideational and institutional legacies of the African American Civil Rights movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, a hegemonic period for American racial liberalism. How have
$PHULFD¶VPXOWLSOHWUDGLWLRQVSOD\HGRXWLQLPPLJUDQWLQFRUSRUDWLRn in the first quarter of
the twenty-first century, and how will they shape immigrant incorporation in the future?
IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA¶S MULTIPLE TRADITIONS
Rogers Smith counters classic characterizations 2 of American political culture as
predominantly liberal. In such descriptions, illiberal traditions and practices (racism,
sexism and other ascriptive discrimination) are viewed as the anarchic expressions of the
ignorant and prejudiced, traditions that will eventually submit to the liberal ideologies and
practices intrinsic to the American political system. Smith argues a more accurate
description reveals the predominance of multiple traditions in American political culture
historically: republican, liberal and illiberal traditions that have intertwined, contradicted
and constrained one another.3
Immigration politics has perennially reflected these multiple traditions. Polls have
IRXQGPDMRULWLHVRI$PHULFDQVWRERWKUHYHUH$PHULFD¶VLPPLJUDQWURRWVZKLOHKDUERULQJ
deep suspicions of its immigration present.4 Daniel Tichenor also referHQFHV 6PLWK¶V
multiple traditions approach in citing the requisite cross-partisan coalitions for political
development in immigration control policy throughout American history. 5 Tichenor sees
these traditions represented in the perennial spectrum of interests ranging from liberal
multicultural pluralism to illiberal protectionism which have contested, constrained and
intertwined in immigration control policy. Tichenor likewise sees race as intrinsic to these
contestations±±central to immigrant admissions and incorporation debates.
THE ROLE OF RACE IN IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM AND ITS EXTENSION TO IMMIGRATION

2. Smith, supra note 1, at 550.
3. Id.
4. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 254 (Ira
Katznelson, et al. eds., 2002).
5. Id. at 283.
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The subnational immigrant incorporation debates featured in these two books are
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Zepeda-Millán and Williamson similarly theorize how race is the primary framing
for the politics of immigrant incorporation in their respective cases. In both studies, how
immigrants are racialized by anti-immigrant forces and the extent to which immigrants
mobilize as a racialized group of linked fate is foundational to the politics of immigrant
LQFRUSRUDWLRQLQWKHVHFDVHV&RQFXUULQJZLWK6PLWK¶VPXOWLSOHWUDGLWLRQVWKHRU\LQVWHDG
of being a relic of the past, racial politics is intrinsic to the politics of immigrant
incorporation, with those for and against couching their positions in racial terms. Hence,
their studies also illustrate the current role of race in twenty-first century American politics
and its influence on immigrant incorporation more specifically.
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6. See Desmond King & Rogers Smith, Racial Orders in American Political Development, in RACE AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 80 (Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian T. Warren eds., 2008). King
and Smith argue that political development in race can be viewed through the perennial competition between
competing racial orders (an egalitarian racial order and a segregationist (pre-1965)/non-transformational (post1965) order). Id. at 80±84. They define racial [institutional] orders as coalitions of state institutions and other
political actors and organizations that seek to secure governing power to allocate power, resources and status
along racial lines. Id. at 80. Coalitions are bound together by racial concepts, aims, and commitments although
individual actors may not share all of these in the same degree. Id. at 81.
7. Id. at 93±94.
8. TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 220.
9. Id. at 221.
10. Christian Joppke, Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration, 50 WORLD POL. 266, 275 (1998).
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framed by the poliWLFDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOOHJDFLHVRIWKHV&LYLO5LJKWVHUD,Q6PLWK¶V
ZRUNZLWK'HVPRQG.LQJ$PHULFD¶VPXOWLSOHWUDGLWLRQVIRVWHUFRPSHWLQJUDFLDORUGHUV
(an egalitarian order versus a white supremacist/non-transformationist order) that when
traced historically can offer a framework explaining political development in race over
time.6 King and Smith argue that the egalitarian racial order unequivocally delegitimized
overt racism and de jure segregation by the end of the 1960s, ushering in institutional and
legal configurations authorizing the state to police and facilitate racial egalitarianism. 7
These included the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration Act of 1965,
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The racial/ethnic
demographics of the post 1965 immigrants and the race-neutral language of Civil Rights
legislation extended protections to and facilitated the incorporation of immigrants.
Extensions include the Immigration Act of 1965, which embodied the racial egalitarianism
of its time; extending protections/largesse from the ESEA, the Civil Rights Act and Voting
Rights Act to immigrants; the Bilingual Education Act (Title VII of the ESEA); the Lau
rulings (requiring states to accommodate second language students); and the Plyler v. Doe
UXOLQJ JXDUDQWHHLQJ DFFHVV WR SXEOLF HGXFDWLRQ IRU XQGRFXPHQWHG VWXGHQWV 7KH ³ULJKWV
UHYROXWLRQ´PRUHJHQHUDOO\VSDZQHGE\WKH&LYLO5LJKWVPRYHPHQWEURXJKWWKHULJKWVRI
immigrants to approximate those of citizens.8 Moreover, civil rights era sensibilities made
restrictionist initiatives targeting non-white immigrants vulnerable to accusations of
racism, making such initiatives less legitimate as viable approaches to regulating
immigrant flows or opposing initiatives of cultural recognition. 9 The increasingly
entrenched immigrant rights lobby at the federal and state level successfully employed
charges of racism to counter restrictionist proposals, helping to secure expansive
immigration control and cultural recognition legislation from the 1970s through 1990. This
hegemonic period of civil rights egalitarianism facilitated liberalization in immigrant
incorporation initiatives at the federal and state level. Immigrants had access to welfare
benefits, bilingual education programs, public education regardless of legal status, voting
rights protections, refugee admittance and resettling programs, and affirmative action
redistributive benefits.10
Zepeda-Millán¶VFDVHVLOOXVWUDWHKRZWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGLGHDWLRQDOSDUDGLJPV of
civil rights liberalism influence political and bureaucratic elites in the small to medium
sized cities of study. Zepeda-Millán¶VJHQHUDOILQGLQJLVWKDWVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HFLWLHV
have generally been accommodating to new immigrant populations despite the
increasingly restrictionist tenor of the national debate and similar (racialized) sentiments
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among their populations.11 Zepeda-Millán argues that the aforementioned political and
institutional legacies of civil rights liberalism were a primary stimulus to political and
EXUHDXFUDWLFHOLWHV¶DFFRPPRGDWLQJUHVSRQVHVLQWKHFDVHVVWXGLHG²viewing immigrants
as clients worthy of protection from discrimination and incorporation into the polity. 12
IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION DEBATES AMID AN AGING CIVIL RIGHTS HEGEMON

THE ASCENSION OF MODERN NATIVISM
Liberal interests also prevailed partly by separating illegal immigration from legal
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11. ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 1.
12. Id. at 2±3.
13. DANIEL MARTINEZ HOSANG, RACIAL PROPOSITIONS: BALLOT INITIATIVES AND THE MAKING OF
POSTWAR CALIFORNIA (2010).
14. King & Smith, supra note 6, at 87±94.
15. Id. at 93.
16. Gregory A. Huber & Thomas J. Epenshade, Neo-Isolationism, Balanced Budget, Conservatism, and the
Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants, 31 INT¶L MIGRATION REV. 1031, 1034 (1997).
17. TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 85.
18. Id. at 242±44; see Antje Ellerman, Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State, 38 POL.
& SOC. 408 (2010).
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These two studies, however, capture the US at a point distant enough from the
KHJHPRQLFDVFHQVLRQRI³FLYLOULJKWVOLEHUDOLVP´ 13 in the mid-1960s and 1970s, where its
institutional and political legacies have been weakened, presenting changing political
environments for immigrant incorporation debates. In Zepeda-Millán¶V FDVHV WKH
renaissance of restrictionist framings in the national immigration debate has made the more
accommodating stances of urban and bureaucratic elites more politically problematic
especially in red leaning states. ,Q :LOOLDPVRQ¶V FDVHV DQWL-immigrant backlashes²
emboldened by the increasingly restrictionist stances of the Republican Party since 2000²
all but halted the mobilization of the 2006 protests from having any effect on the
immigration reform debate in the immediate succeeding years.
Since the late 1970s, there has been a whittling away at the institutional and
ideational hegemony of 1960s civil rights liberalism. With segregation resolved the
politics of race transitioned in the 1970s to a new issue of the day, government initiatives
to correct racial inequities. 14 Using the King and Smith framing of race and political
development, the losing white supremacist order reformed as a non-transformational order
opposing government programs to aid minorities. 15 With a slowing economy, stagnant
wages, deindustrialization, white collar layoffs/outsourcing, aversion to taxes, and
growing isolationism and nativism,16 the non-transformational order was more in line with
the political zeitgeist than civil rights liberalism. Nevertheless, liberal immigration
interests continued to score victories, increasing refugee and legal immigration ceilings
and policy arrangements sanctioning cultural recognition, through 1990. Coalitions of
liberal cosmopolitans, business, and labor prevailed, successfully removing policymaking
from electoral politics. 17 Collectively, with the aforementioned political sensitivities to
opposing [non-white] immigrant incorporation, restrictionist efforts were stymied through
the 1980s.18
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TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 239.
ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 120.
Huber & Epenshade, supra note 16, at 1036.
TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 267.
Joppke, supra note 10, at 271.
California¶s trilogy of referenda in the 1990s refers to the following:
1. Proposition 187 which sought to establish a California-run citizenship screening system and deny all
non-emergency welfare benefits (including public education) to the undocumented.
2. Proposition 209: ended affirmative action programs in state governmental institutions.
3. 3URSRVLWLRQHQGHGELOLQJXDOHGXFDWLRQSURJUDPVLQ&DOLIRUQLD¶VSXEOLFVFKRROV.
25. Joppke, supra note 10, at 280.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
27. ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 138.
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immigration and refugee policy.19 However, as the undocumented population increased
ZLWKWKH³EURZQLQJRI$PHULFD´DQimmigrant backlash emerged that equated Latinx with
illegal and illegal with Latinx.20 Combining with a politics of austerity and nativism,21 the
racialization of Latinx as an illegal/illegitimate presence created a political context where
the politics of restrictionism and cultural exclusivism22 increasingly resonated beginning
in the late 1980s. Moreover, restrictionist forces increasingly exploited the disconnect
between accommodating elites and restrictionist electorates with the increasing
employment (and resonance) of anti-immigrant populism.23 :LOOLDPVRQ¶V VXEQDWLRQDO
cases capture this latter dynamic and its effect on immigrant incorporation debates. Both
studies capture the fusing of immigrants with illegal/illegitimate²revealing how
immigrants are racialized.
The trilogy of referenda24 in California in the 1990s attacking immigration and civil
rights liberalism emerged in this context, marking the beginning of the more Trumpian
style nativism. Specifically, Proposition 187 unabashedly targeted immigrants¶DFFHVVWR
education and welfare benefits. Despite passing by substantial majorities in California,
most of its provisions would be overturned by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, some of
its policy provisions wound up in the Newt Gingrich led immigration reform, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, in 1996.25 The Act restricted
welfare benefit access for both legal and illegal immigrants. The courts have said such
distinctions are permitted except for those pertaining to education and emergency benefits.
Hence, conservative forces were able to weaken the access to welfare secured via the
³ULJKWVUHYROXWLRQ´UHHVWDEOLVKLQJDKLHUDUFK\EHWZHHQFLWL]HQVDQGLPPLJUDQWVUHJDUGOHVV
of legal status.26 Zepeda-Millán also cites this opposition to welfare benefits as
foundational to the restrictionist sentiment among the non-immigrant populations in his
cases.27
From Proposition 187 forward proponents of illiberal, anti-immigrant politics began
to institutionalize these racial concepts and aims. Donald Trump (who also fused economic
protectionism²traditionally a position of the left²with his nativism) has been the latest
beneficiary of this turn in politics. Having kicked off his victorious presidential campaign
claiming that Mexicans are murders and rapists suggests that illiberal politics has more
political legitimacy now than it has had since prior to the 1960s. $PHULFD¶V PXOWLSOH
traditions are on far more even political ground in the first quarter of the twenty-first
century. Williamson and Zepeda-Millán feature subnational case studies where the politics
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of immigrant incorporation reveal this post-&LYLO 5LJKWV EDODQFH RI $PHULFD¶V PXOWLSOH
traditions.
THE RACIALIZATION OF IMMIGRANT COLLECTIVE ACTION²THE 2006 IMMIGRANT
PROTESTS

C M
Y K

03/03/2020 13:59:43

28. Id. at 146, 209.
29. Id. at 6. (Zepeda-Millán argues political process theory lacks the dynamic understanding of the
relationship between threat and structural opportunities that social movement theorists proffer).
30. Id. at 8. (Zepeda-Millán¶VWKHRU\DGGUHVVHV2NDmoto and Ebert and Bloemraad et al., who both call for
more research into the relationship between perceived threats and immigrant identity. See Dina Okamoto & Kim
Ebert, Beyond the Ballot: Immigrant Collective Action in Gateways and New Destinations in the United States,
57 SOC. PROBS. 529 (2010); Irene Bloemraad et al., The Protests of 2006: What Were They, How Do We
Understand Them, Where Do We Go, in RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: THE FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN 21ST
CENTURY AMERICA 3 (2011)).
31. Id. at 10.
32. H.R. Res. 4437, 102nd Cong. (1992) (enacted).
33. ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 12.
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Chris Zepeda-Millán¶VLatino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and
Activism GHSLFWV WKH WXJ R¶ ZDU RI OLEHUDO DQG LOOLEHUDO WUDGLWLRQV ZLWK QHLWKHU JDLQLQJ
hegemony. Zepeda-Millán argues that responding to the racialized politics of The Border
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, commonly known
as the Sensenbrenner House Bill or HR 4437, Latinxs mobilized with a sense of linkedfate (cutting across legal status and class) to counter a proposed bill they saw as an
existential threat to the Latinx community at large²a process Zepeda-Millán argues is a
form of racial identity formation.28 The study investigates the causes and impacts of mass
Latinx protests between February and May of 2006. Zepeda-Millán uses the study to
investigate the link between immigrant collective action and racial identity formation in
explaining the unprecedented mobilization of Latinxs. Investigation also aims to more
fully theorize how opportunities and threats are negotiated by collective action campaigns.
Merging theoretical insights from political process and social movement theorists, the
study looks at mass popular Latinx protests across three American cities. 29
Zepeda-Millán theorizes how perceived threats impact immigrant identity and how
this relationship influences collective action.30 The key to understanding this relationship
is seeing threats as multidimensional: the scope of the threat, and the timing, source and
visibility of the threat.31 The scope of HR 4437 was broad: it aimed to criminalize illegal
immigration and extended criminal penalties to those assisting the undocumented,
effectively criminalizing broad sectors of the Latinx population²potentially targeting the
undocumented and legal immigrants (those assisting the undocumented) alike. 32 This
broad scope facilitated broad based mobilization and identity formation among Latinx. As
Latinx share a common language, Spanish-language mobilization offered a lingual
connection across social class and race, helping unite a broad coalition of those threatened
by the bill. Legislation came from a single source, Congress, making it straightforward for
political entrepreneurs to attribute a target for mobilization. 7KH ELOO¶V ZLGH VFRSH DQG
single source made it easy to make the threat of HR 4437 highly visible in the media.33
Timing wise, as a legislative proposal, the slow nature of the legislative process allowed
for sufficient time to educate and mobilize a coordinated attack. The racialized nature of
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Id. at 14.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 22.
The fusing of Latinx with illegality/illegitimacy has resonated most when targeted at Mexicans, being the
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34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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the anti-immigrant politics of HR 4437 combined with its broad scope triggered a sense of
linked fate and group consciousness, fostering mobilization of a broad-based coalition.
7KHUDFLDOL]HGQDWXUHRIWKHGHEDWHVWHPPHGIURP+5SURSRQHQWV¶IXVLQJRI/DWLQ[
immigration as illegal and/or illegitimate²recycling a traditional illiberal strain in
American immigration politics, one that targeted Chinese, German, and southern and
eastern European immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Zepeda-Millán¶V
argument here is thorough and compelling, using process tracing to account for city
responses over time and marshalling interviews with various movement leaders to convey
the threat felt by legal and undocumented immigrants within the case studies. 34
Zepeda-Millán then provides a framework to explain the historically massive
protests and the varied degrees of collective action across three American cities (Los
Angeles, New York City, and Fort Meyers, Florida), the rapid demobilization after the
protests achieved their immediate goal, and the policy and electoral implications of the
protest movement. HR 4437 proposed increasing border and interior enforcement of illegal
immigration, criminalizing the undocumented status²changing the violation from a civil
offense to a federal felony²while also making those who assisted the undocumented in
any way subject to criminal prosecution. Four factors and their variation in the three cities
of study are investigated to explain the varied degrees of mass mobilization: the
appropriation and use of pre-existing community based resources; the appropriation and
use of ethnic media to disseminate calls to action; the increased salience of collective
DFWLRQ LGHQWLWLHV DQG WKH EXLOGLQJ RI EURDG DQG GLYHUVH FRDOLWLRQV´ 35 The protests are
woUWK\RIVWXG\DVWKH\ZHUHXQH[SHFWHGFRQVLGHULQJWKH/DWLQ[SRSXODWLRQ¶VGHPRJUDSKLF
characteristics: a poorer community with comparatively low levels of education and
limited access to requisite resources, augmented with a large undocumented population.
Zepeda-Millán argues that the 2006 protests are an example of large-scale collective action
taking place amid a great political threat and constricted political opportunities (due to
their lack of wealth and access to resources to affect decisionmakers). 36 In addition to the
broad-based group consciousness caused by the scope and racialized politics of HR 4437,
collective action was also facilitated by appropriating and employing pre-existing
community resources to disseminate calls to action. Resources such as ethnic radio and
community soccer leagues were used as forums to educate the community on the threat of
HR 4437, build coalitions, and organize protest events. With a sense of group
consciousness activated, the employment of these community resources to coordinate calls
to action made such efforts more authentic for the group: group members using community
created resources to communicate calls to action to defend their communities from a threat
from without.37 The success of collective action subsequently becomes a function of the
KRPRJHQHLW\RIWKHVWDWH¶VLPPLJUDQWFRPPXQLWLHVDV+5ZDVXQGHUVWRRGWRWDUJHW
the Latinx (specifically the Mexican) community. Those cities with more homogenous
Latinx populations, especially if Mexicans38 were the majority (such as Los Angeles and
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Fort Myers, Florida), were better able to appropriate their community resources to bring
attention to the threat of HR 4437 and make calls for action by actualizing the group
consciousness elicited from the racialized politics of HR 4437.39 This explains the massive
protest activity in Los Angeles, the unexpectedly large protests in Fort Meyers, Florida,
and the underperforming activity in New York City40
In all three cases, Zepeda-Millán depicts the central role of race. The racialized
debate of an initiative targeting a racialized group elicited a racialized collective action
response from its targets. In New York, where group consciousness was fragmented
EHFDXVH RI WKH KHWHURJHQRXV LPPLJUDQW FRPPXQLWLHV¶ IUDJPHQWHG VHQVH RI JURup
consciousness, mobilization efforts were depressed.41 :KDW¶VVLJQLILFDQWLQDOOWKUHHFDVHV
is that race is a tool employed by both liberal and illiberal aspirants. This speaks to the
evolution of the politics of race (its liberal employment evident in the logic of
redistributive policies such as affirmative action and minority empowerment movements)
since the 1960s.42
THE NEW LEGITIMACY OF IMMIGRANT RESTRICTIONISM
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largest ethnic group of the US Latinx immigrant population. See ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 131±32.
39. Id. at 18±19.
40. New York City¶s immigrant population is more heterogeneous consisting of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
Central Americans and significant non-Latinx immigrant populations. See id. at 101±32.
41. Id. at 119.
42. Christian Joppke, How Immigration Is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View, 22 ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 629, 633 (1999).
43. Smith, supra note 1, at 549±66.
44. ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 139±41.
45. Id. at 172.
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%XW DV 6PLWK¶V PXOWLSOH WUDGLWLRQV WKHRU\ DUJXHV WKH SROLWLFDO UHVRQDQFH RI WKH
individual traditions ebb and flow, intertwine in political resonance, traction and/or
KHJHPRQ\EXWWKH\¶UHQHYHUFRPSOHWHO\HOLPLQDWHGDQGQRUPDOO\FRQVWUDLQWKHRWKHUZKHQ
paradigmatic or hegemonic. 43 Accordingly, in the more level political playing field for
liberal and illiberal traditions, the 2006 protests garnered a multiprong immigrant backlash
from within and without government. Increased government raids, deportations, state and
local ordinances and hate crimes targeted the Latinx community. 44 Contrary to the threat
posed by HR 4437, the response came from many sources, making it more difficult for
immigrant rights advocates to target a response. As these attacks were widely
communicated via the same community resources, many Latinxs felt the 2006 protests had
worsened their situation and abstained from further organizing. Moreover, the protests
were polarizing outside of the Latinx community. Despite succeeding in killing HR 4437,
protests had the effect of further polarizing Congress over illegal immigration with the
Democrats and Republicans assuming more uncompromising positions on the
undocumented, all but killing the potential for major immigration reform. 45 Illegal
immigration had been separated from the immigration debate in the 1980s, to remove its
divisive politics from the legal immigration and refugee debates²netting expansive
policies through 1990. Zepeda-Millán¶V ILQGLQJV KHUH LOOXVWUDWH WKH SROLWLFDO VDJDFLW\ RI
this move. Latinx mass protests also galvanized the anti-immigrant movement. Hate
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AMERICAN LIBERALISM LIVES: THE ELECTORAL FACTOR
Nevertheless, the liberal tradition provided an alternative avenue for the immigrant
rights movement: elections. Immigrant rights groups in the cities with larger populations
of naturalized immigrants (NYC and Los Angeles) took advantage of the group
consciousness and the mobilization of legal Latinxs to defeat HR 4437, registering Latinxs
to vote.50 Latinxs provided a key constituency for the successful presidential candidacy of
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46. Id. at 28.
47. Id. at 29; TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 5; ANTJE ELLERMAN, STATES AGAINST MIGRANTS: DEPORTATION
IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 67 (2009).
48. ELLERMAN, supra note 47, at 2.
49. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 271.
50. John Mollenkopf & Jennifer Hochschild, Immigrant Political Incorporation: Comparing Success in the
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crimes and other persecutions spiked in the aftermath of the protests.
Anti-immigrant forces had responded. Collectively, these all had a chilling effect on
Latinx mobilization in the aftermath of the 2006 protests. The immigrant rights
PRYHPHQW¶VODUJHUJRDOof netting liberal immigration policy reform subsequently was not
achieved. The more open restrictionism, sometimes fusing with ascriptive discrimination,
is noteworthy suggesting an increased legitimacy compared to the 1980s, and early 1990s
(prior to CalLIRUQLD¶V 3URSRVLWLRQ   7KLV VXJJHVWV D SDUWLDO UROOEDFN RI UDFLDOimmigration egalitarian political development when considered with the legislative and
court actions that have gutted civil rights liberalism.
From Proposition 187 forward, illiberal anti-immigrant forces began to
institutionalize their racial concepts and aims, placing illiberal politics on more politically
legitimate footing nationally²framings Williamson finds influential on local elite
responses to increasing immigrant populations in his cities of focus.46 The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act has already been mentioned. The
mid 1990s also saw the militarization of border enforcement,47 institutionalizing the fusing
of immigrants with illegality. After the September 11th attacks of 2001, the politics of
security changed further. In March of 2003, the Department of Homeland Security was
created, the largest bureaucratic reorganization in a century. 48 The Department of
Homeland Security facilitated the creation of United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). The Department of Homeland Security and ICE had the capacity and
the political legitimacy to be more aggressive in immigration enforcement. The Bush
administration used the political resonance of security to establish cooperative
arrangements between federal and local police in immigration enforcement (the Secure
Communities Program, for example), which President Trump has reimplemented after
being rescinded by President Obama. Williamson does find that small cities closer to the
border are less accommodating of immigrants, arguing that political and bureaucratic elites
are more influenced by the criminal framing of immigrants in these cities. 49 The postprotest raids and deportation sweeps in Zepeda-Millán¶V VWXG\ ZHUH SDUW RI WKHVH
initiatives. Restrictionism had become more politically legitimate in 2007 than it had been
in 1986. The hegemonic hold on political sensibilities of the civil rights era were coming
to an end.
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Barack Obama, the more immigrant friendly candidate in 2008. This liberal electoral effect
KDVEHHQFHQWUDOWRWKRVHDUJXLQJIRUWKHSUHGRPLQDQFHRI$PHULFD¶VOLEHUDOWUDGLWLRQ²
LPPLJUDQWV¶ FRPSDUDWLYHO\ TXLFN QDWXUDOL]DWLRQ DQG LQFRUSRUDWLRQ LQWR WKH $PHULFDQ
electoral system.51
Zepeda-Millán concludes that to conquer the rise of anti-immigrant populism such
as that associated with the rise and election of Donald Trump, mobilization efforts that
appeal to shared persecution, eliciting cross-group consciousness are necessary to
galvanize pan-Latinx mobilization and pan-ethnic mobilization more generally. 52 This
FRQFOXVLRQ LPSOLHV WKH LQFUHDVHG SURPLQHQFH RI $PHULFD¶V LOOLEHUDO WUDGLWLRQ FXUUHQWO\
requires increased mobilization efforts (as opposed to simple appeals to racism) for
immigrant rights interests to prevail.
SMALL TOWN HOSPITALITY AND AMERICA¶S MULTIPLE TRADITIONS
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United States and Western Europe, 33 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 6, 18, 20 (2010).
51. Id. at 13.
52. ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1, at 210±14.
53. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 1.
54. Id. at 1±2. The general term for varying degrees of resisting compliance with federal immigration
enforcement efforts.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 17, 19±20.
57. Id. at 21.
58. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 2, 16.
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$ELJDLO)LVKHU:LOOLDPVRQ¶VWelcoming New Americans: Local Governments and
Immigrant Incorporation investigates small and medium size city responses to influxes in
their immigrant populations. Large cities have gotten all the press and attention for
SXEOLFO\ZHOFRPLQJLPPLJUDQWVDQGUHIXJHHVLQWKHIDFHRI3UHVLGHQW7UXPS¶VDQGRWKHU
restrictionist efforts. More than half53 RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VODUJHSROLWLFDOO\OLEHUDOFLWLHVKDYH
in varying degrees been more accommodating to immigrants and refugees. These large
cities, even if they have not declared themselves Sanctuary Cities, 54 have either made
public statements welcoming immigrants or have set up special offices to facilitate their
incorporation. Williamson argues that their midsized and smaller brethren, although
neither declaring themselves Sanctuary Cities nor being as likely to set up special offices
of accommodation, have similarly established a range of informal practices that have
generally supported rather than opposed immigrants.55 The book sets out to describe these
accommodating practices in small to medium size cities, where and when they are likely
to occur, and the benefits and pitfalls for actual immigrant incorporation. The study uses
process tracing and interviews of political and bureaucratic officials to trace the responses
of three cities to increasing immigrant populations since the 1980s.56 The study then uses
a national survey of political and bureaucratic officials in small to medium size cities to
assess their perspectives and responses to immigrant communities. 57 Survey results are
employed to discuss how generalizable the case study findings are to small and medium
size cities nationwide. Williamson argues that understanding these practices is important
due to the spread of immigrant destinations since the 1990s from the large traditional
gateway cities to these smaller cities and municipalities.58 As these smaller cities
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increasingly become forums for immigrant incorporation, understanding these practices
assists in understanding why these practices fail to advance immigrant incorporation as
well as aids in improving public attitudes to their increasing presence. Understanding the
new, municipal role of these new gateways is also important to understanding immigrant
incorporation as the traditional institutions that facilitated immigrant incorporation in the
early twentieth century (unions and parties) have either declined or reoriented their
attention away from immigrants, leaving municipals with a more central role in immigrant
incorporation.
:LOOLDPVRQ H[SODLQV VPDOO FLWLHV¶ DFFRPPRGDWLQJ UHVSRQVH DV D IXQFWLRQ RI WKH
divergent interests of political and bureaucratic elites from its citizens. 59 Williamson finds
that urban elites are more likely to view immigrants as deserving clients worthy of federal
(civil rights) protections and work to build trust with and serve the new immigrant
communities.60 These views, however, differ from the non-immigrant population
(especially those in predominantly Republican areas), who are more likely to view
immigrants increasing presence skeptically and as illegitimate. 61 (OLWHV¶DFFRPPRGDWLRQ
of immigrants makes them susceptible to electoral backlash as well as making the political
atmosphere less receptive to immigrant political incorporation²as the elite-constituent
disconnect leaves the latter resentful of immigrants and accommodating initiatives.
Williamson concludes that for accommodating measures to elicit less electoral blowback,
elites need to encourage forums where immigrants and locals can interact authentically on
equal footing encouraging recognition of their shared fate and contributions as city
inhabitants.62
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM AND ACCOMMODATING URBAN ELITES
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59. Id. at 5±6.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 15. Commenters of political development in immigration have recognized this disconnect between
elites and the general population. Freeman in his classic piece, explaining expansionary immigrant politics in the
post war era argues that clientele politics leads elites to remove immigration from electoral politics leading to
expansive policy. See also TICHENOR, supra note 4.
63. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 6.
64. See 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
65. See 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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Williamson finds that federal regulations and national political elites help frame how
the state should treat immigrants and that these are the primary influence on subnational
responses to immigrant presences.63 For example, the Plyler v. Doe64 and Lau v. Nichols65
rulings, which require states and localities to provide access to public education for
immigrant children and for its schools to accommodate second language students,
respectfully, legally framed elites to see immigrants as deserving clients of state
accommodation; Civil Rights era protections invite federal scrutiny in cases of
discrimination. Moreover, negative (especially national) media coverage from
restrictionist initiatives has also chastened localities into being more accommodating,
fearing reputational costs which could harm capital investment and/or make their cities
less attractive destinations for new (upwardly mobile) settlers. Williamson concludes her

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B

03/03/2020 13:59:43

PARRIS, G - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

274

2/18/2020 6:41 AM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:263

study arguing that as conservatives continue to whittle away the legal and institutional
legacy of Civil Rights liberalism, national framings may soon become more restrictionist,
diluting what has been a mostly liberal paradigm for immigrant incorporation. 66 With such
framings weakened, restrictionist, illiberal forces are advantaged as local elites will be less
encouraged to view immigrants as deserving clients and for electoral reasons may give in
to their constituents¶ more restrictionist views.67
:LOOLDPVRQ¶V FRQFOXVLRQ VXJJHVWV WKDW DV WKH LOOLEHUDO WUDGLWLRQ EHFRPHV PRUH
politically legitimate, institutionalized in court rulings and law, this will affect prospects
for immigrant incorporation in the decades to come. As small and midsized cities are
increasingly forums for immigrant incorporation, this could perhaps create a more
bifurcated setting for immigrant incorporation: more accommodating in large liberal cities
and small cities in liberal states; less accommodation in small cities in conservative states.
As Williamson cites, this is already the general perception of small and medium size cities.
However, with cKDQJHV WR WKH EDODQFH RI SRZHU LQ $PHULFD¶V PXOWLSOH WUDGLWLRQV WKLV
perception may be more real than myth in the decades to come.
THE NECESSITY OF PAN-ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION IN AN AGE OF ASCENDANT
ILLIBERALISM
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66. WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 270±74.
67. Id.
68. Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, Trump’s Election Is Actually a Return to Normal Racial Politics.
Here Is Why, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/11/17/trumps-election-is-a-return-to-normal-at-least-in-u-s-attitudes-on-race/.
69. Id.
70. TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 43±44.
71. See, e.g., id. at 150±52, 170±75.
72. King & Smith, supra note 6, at 88; see also TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 179±96.
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Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith argue that the 2016 election of Donald Trump was
a return to normalcy in racial politics for the US. 68 7KH\DUJXHWKDW$PHULFD¶VLOOLEHUDO
tradition has typically had the support of one of the political parties, making racial progress
difficult.69 Only during times of war against illiberal forces has this support lessened
making possible racial progress. Klinkner and Smith correctly tie the ebbs and flow of
racial progress to the major wars. And the election of Trump may indeed be a return to
normalcy in racial politics. However, the end of World War I saw the triumph of illiberal
forces in the passage of the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 establishing the racial
quotas system. Liberal immigration laws, however, were the norm in the nineteenth
century before World War I and only came to an end because post war isolationism finally
tipped the coalition scale in the restrictionist favor.70 $QLPSOLFDWLRQRI7LFKHQRU¶VRYHUDOO
findings and framework is that although race is intrinsic to immigration politics, political
development in immigration control policy has had a different trajectory than political
development in race.71 Although there is significant overlap in the interests (cultural
exclusionists tend to concur with white supremacists on racial and immigration policy,
illustrated in the twentieth century coalition of Western conservatives and southern
segregationists on related issues72), their preferences differ with respects to race and
immigration because of the differences in the salient political debates they engender.
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Dejure and residential segregation, the franchise, redistributive policies have been the
issues defining debates in race.73 Immigrant labor, bilingualism, and cultural assimilation
have been those for immigration politics.74 Consequently, independent, separate interests
have developed orienting political debate in race and immigration. It is more accurate to
see race and immigration as separate political issues with separate historic trajectories in
which the former, nevertheless, is often intrinsic to the politics of the latter.
The US party system nevertheless is increasingly polarized along racial and
immigration positions. Zepeda-Milan and Williamson investigate immigrant incorporation
within this new political setting in American racial and immigration politics and find one
where neither the liberal nor illiberal sides can claim complete victory. However, a
standoff is in some sense a victory for the illiberal side as it is they who have been
ascendant since the late 1970s, and it is they who currently command an ally (or at least
an enabler) in the Oval Office, willing enablers in the Republican Party, and in the
conservative majority on the Supreme Court. And contrary to the liberal traditionalists,
these studies illustrate that race has not submitted to American liberalism. It has
transcended, reified by both liberals and illiberals, illustrating its place as a pillar of the
American political tradition. Zepeda-Millán DQG :LOOLDPVRQ ILQG $PHULFD¶V SROLWLFDO
culture as one of multiple traditions with race at its center.75 Any account of immigrant
incorporation is incomplete without acknowledgement of how intrinsic race and these
traditions are to the politics of immigrant incorporation.
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73. King & Smith, supra note 6, at 92±93.
74. Joppke, supra note 42, at 633±37; TICHENOR, supra note 4, at 36.
75. See ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, supra note 1; WILLIAMSON, supra note 48.

